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November 5, 1999/26 Cheshvan 5760, Vol. 52, No.10
Peace in eleven months?
Negotiators must protect Israel's interests
KENNETH W. STEIN
Emory University
In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agreed that a framework for final-status talks will be established by February 2000 and final-status talks would be scheduled for completion by September 2000. It is highly unlikely that all of the difficult issues - Jerusalem, water, borders, settlements, refugees, and the nature of the Palestinian entity/state - will be tied up by then in neatly arranged negotiating packages. Some are likely to be partially completed, while others are intentionally postponed because of sensitivity and complexity.
What is also likely is Palestinian dissatisfaction about what is not achieved. How will the variety of Palestinian voices in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem respond to unfulfilled expectations about the final-status deliberations? And how might the U.S. anticipate their complaints and diffuse potential misunderstandings?
Israeli leaders possess the economic strength, military might, and political will to limit Palestinian aspirations, especially when Palestinian objectives are contrary to Israel's present security or future national interests. Several years ago, Uri Savir, when he was Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, told a gathering of academics in Jerusalem that "in these negotiations, Israel holds the face cards in the deck; the Palestinians have the 2s, 3s, and 4s - Israelis are negotiating with themselves." Last March, Abdullah Hourani, a former member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Executive Committee, said the "(Oslo) agreements give Israel practical control over every aspect of Palestinian life."
Let us assume that Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak continue their regular communication establishing a framework for final-status talks. Direct or indirect meetings will continue, as they did in Oslo in early November with President Clinton, and as they have in Gaza, Israel, Washington, and other locations through trusted envoys. Perhaps they will culminate in a Camp David-style meeting early next year, with the Americans helping to shape the framework and refine the principles that will guide the final-status conclusions. Committees on each issue - Jerusalem, refugees, water, borders, settlements, etc. - will continue to plod through the details. Israel will guard its interests but with a consciousness that the other side must be able to sell the necessary compromises to the Palestinian "street." The object is not to unleash a firestorm of fierce criticism that snowballs into violence of any short or prolonged duration.
The general outline from the talks may look like this: A borough system will be established in Jerusalem; the city will remain undivided with Israeli sovereignty over all of it; the Palestinians will have some political presence in East Jerusalem; and there will be free access for all to all Holy Sites. Palestinians will have a contiguous mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza, connected by a corridor or two. Palestinians will not enjoy the prerogative of establishing an army or creating treaties without some Israeli consent. No foreign army will be allowed in the Palestinian entity or state.
The Palestinians will decide what kind of government and laws they want but shall be prevented from instituting actions which are hostile to Israel. Borders will be drawn so that a vast majority of Israeli settlements will come under Israeli sovereignty, but some may remain in the Palestinian state. The future of others may be left to future adjudication.
Only Palestinian refugees from the 1967 war will have the right to return to the Palestinian state, and they will number less that 100,000. Their return will be determined by the economic capacity of the Palestinian state to absorb them. Water issues will be continuously monitored and controlled by joint Palestinian and Israeli committees. Finally, while the populations will be politically separated, economic requirements will demand that at least one-third of the Palestinian labor force continue to work within Israeli borders. Implementation of proposed conclusions for all the final-status issues will require coordination by both sides with the assistance of the United States.
What cannot be ignored is the possibility that between now and September 2000 or sometime during the implementation of the final-status agreement, Arafat dies. The scramble to succeed him may immediately influence the substance and pace of the negotiations. Those competing for his mantle are likely to want to show to the Palestinian "street" their unwavering commitment to core Palestinian positions. This in turn might cause a hardening of Palestinian negotiating positions and perhaps severely slow down the activities of the various final-status committees.
Neither Arafat's longevity, progress on the Syrian-Israeli track, nor the American election cycle in 2000 will change the necessity to provide economic assistance and investment capital from private and public sources for the Palestinian entity or state. Creating jobs, dismantling the refugee camps, and boosting economic development will shore up Palestinian support.
Also, in carrying out a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, attention must be paid to the territorial integrity and economic well-being of Jordan. Jordan will have to play some active, but not central, part in structuring industrial zones, trade agreements, and in receiving its own basket of assistance.
To look back in five years and say the final-status negotiations worked and are being fulfilled, the United States will have to play an active role in peace-seeking, peace-making, and peace-keeping. We are and will remain the Elmer's negotiating glue; it is in our national interests.
Kenneth W. Stein teaches Middle Eastern history and political science at Emory University.
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