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September 5, 2003/Elul 8 5763, Vol. 55, No. 54
Israeli makes gains in post-Oslo world
LESLIE SUSSER
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
JERUSALEM - On the face of it, the Oslo peace process failed to achieve very much. Ten years after Israelis and Palestinians astounded the world by signing the accords, the two sides again are locked in armed struggle and are raising basic questions of legitimacy and recognition.
In terms of conflict resolution, the parties seem to have stumbled back to a pre-Oslo square one.
But the situation today in fact is very different than it was a decade ago. Major political and geopolitical changes in the 10 years since Oslo, and the Oslo process itself, have colored political thinking on both sides.
In Israel, taboos like the existence of a Palestinian state have been irrevocably smashed, while on the Palestinian side there is deeper questioning of the efficacy of the terrorist weapon.
Perhaps most significantly, profound regional and international developments seem to be playing in Israel's favor.
In Israel, the vagaries of the Oslo process changed political thinking on the right and the left. The peace process undercut the right's dream of "Greater Israel," while the process' collapse shattered the left's dream of an idyllic, two-state solution in a "New Middle East."
Before Oslo, the thought of a Likud prime minister agreeing to the establish-ment of a Palestinian state would have been incon-ceivable.
Now, 10 years on, over 60 percent of Israelis - including Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of the Likud - back the two-state solution.
The failure of the parties to see the Oslo process through led to two significant con-clusions on the Israeli side: If there are new agreements, there must be scrupulous third-party monitoring to ensure implementation; but if, ultimately, there is no credible peace partner, Israel should consider unilateral separation from the Palestinians.
The dynamics of Oslo clarified for many Israelis the advantages of a two-state solution and the demographic dangers inherent in the present status quo.
On the Palestinian side, two contradictory post-Oslo strategies emerged: forcing Israeli concessions through terror or abstaining from terror and turning inter-national sympathy into pressure on Israel.
Encouraged by the Israeli retreat from Lebanon in May 2000 and what he perceived as Saddam Hussein's growing power in Iraq, Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat opted for violence.
But his strategy imploded. No Arab states joined the struggle, the international community did not step in and Israel made no political concessions.
Moreover, after Al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attacks in the United States, Palestinian terrorism became assoc-iated with international terrorism, and Israel was allowed unprecedented freedom of action against the terrorists.
Mahmoud Abbas, who became P.A. prime minister in April, led the post-Oslo policy alternative, de-nouncing Arafat's "militar-ization" of the intifada as a huge strategic mistake that played into Israel's hands. Instead, Abbas advocated a strategy of dialogue based on the "road map," coupled with American pressure on Israel.
Regional developments since Oslo further weakened the Palestinian position. Most significantly, the threat of a powerful "Eastern front" against Israel - made up of Iraq, Syria and Jordan - collapsed. In 1994, a year after Oslo, Jordan made peace with Israel, while Saddam Hussein's ouster in April removed Iraq and left Syria isolated, surrounded by American or pro-American forces in Iraq, Turkey, Jordan and Israel.
For the Palestinians, these factors add up to a loss of their "Arab hinterland'' and a growing sense of isolation.
Indeed, the Palestinians have had to turn to Iran for arms and financial aid. Today, according to Israeli intelligence sources, Iranian Revolutionary Guards based in Lebanon are transferring arms and funds to Hamas.
For Israel, the American war in Iraq has a crucial bearing. If, over time, the Americans are seen to have won, it will be a major blow to all radical forces in the Middle East. But if they lose, Israel could find itself confronting buoyant radicals from all over the region.
Leslie Susser is the diplomatic correspondent for the Jerusalem Report.
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