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December 27, 2002/Tevet 22 5763, Vol. 55, No. 18
U.S.-Israel rift looming over Iraq
LESLIE SUSSER
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Never have Israel and the United States had such close coordination on Iraq.
As the anticipated American attack on Baghdad draws nearer, the U.S. military even has been showing Israeli officials its detailed plans for preventing Iraqi missile attacks on Israel.
But the reason for the American operational largesse is clear: The United States does not want Israel to play any military role in the war against Iraq.
Despite the close coordination, Israel has not promised to stay out of the fighting. Moreover, there are sharp differences between the two sides on how to respond if Israel is attacked with nonconventional weapons.
During Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz's mid-December visit to Washington, American officials went out of their way to convince the Israeli delegation that the United States would do all it could to defend Israel, and that there would be no need for Israel to get involved in the war.
The officials said American forces would take decisive action to prevent Iraqi missile launchers from being moved into western Iraq - from where Israel would be in their range - and to take them out if they are. The officials promised that America would show Israel its plans for neutralizing the Iraqi missile launchers, and allow Israel to comment and offer suggestions.
Moreover, the United States said it would send 1,000 American soldiers to Israel with Patriot missiles, to back up Israel's Arrow anti-missile defense system.
If, despite these offensive and defensive measures, an Iraqi missile were to get through and hit Israel, America - not Israel - would retaliate, the officials said.
The problem is that Israel and the United States have a number of fundamentally different strategic interests in the context of the conflict with Iraq.
America does not want direct Israeli involvement in the war to further complicate U.S. ties with the Arab world. But Israel has domestic and regional considerations that make it very difficult to refrain from retaliation if the country is hit by Iraqi missiles, as it did in the 1991 Persian Gulf War under fierce American pressure.
Israeli officials believe Israel's failure to respond then seriously undermined Israel's deterrent posture and encouraged other groups, such as Hezbollah, to attack Israel.
If Israeli casualty figures are high or if the Iraqis attack with nonconventional weapons, Israel's government will feel duty-bound to retaliate - both to satisfy domestic public opinion and, more importantly, to maintain Israel's deterrent capacity in the region.
Mofaz therefore refused to say what the Americans wanted to hear, and would not commit that Israel would avoid getting involved in the war under any circumstances.
On the contrary, Mofaz made it clear that Israel reserves the right to retaliate if it suffers heavy civilian casualties or if it is attacked with noncon-ventional weapons.
However, Mofaz did promise that in return for American consideration of Israel's interests, Israel would coordinate any retaliatory strike with Washington.
That might be why American military planners were smiling after the meeting.
In operational terms, the Mofaz commitment seems to mean that Israel will clear retaliatory plans with the Americans in advance, and will not attack unless given flying times, routes and friend-foe air codes.
That would seem to make an Israeli strike dependent on American approval: If the United States disapproves of the response, it could withhold the operational information, making an attack virtually impossible.
Israeli defense officials acknowledge that this could present a problem, but say they are confident the United States will understand Israel's needs and will make it possible for Israel to retaliate if necessary.
Then again, Washington would want to have a say on the scope of the Israeli response.
Israel would prefer to respond itself, and with great force, to deter other countries in the region from following the Iraqi example. That could mean widespread destruction in Iraq.
"We would want everyone to know it was us, and to realize just what we can do," an Israeli defense official told JTA.
The United States, however, would prefer a far more measured response, one that the United States carries out and controls, because it hopes to rebuild Iraq and Iraqi institutions as quickly as possible in the post-Saddam era.
Israeli officials recall that in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq planned a fighter-bomber biological attack, first sending three conventionally armed MiG bombers to see if they could penetrate Israeli airspace.
If successful, the plan was to follow up with more sorties, including one by a Sukhoi bomber loaded with biological agents. The plan never materialized.
Since the Gulf War, Israeli air defenses have become even tighter, and defense officials say the relatively slow-flying Iraqi "suicide planes'' would be easier to intercept than Scud missiles.
As for missile attacks, the officials rate these as less likely than suicide plane sorties, because the number of missiles Iraq has and its capacity to launch them have been severely curtailed since the 1991 Gulf War, officials say.
Still, Israel is not taking chances, and plans are being considered to inoculate the entire population against smallpox.
The bottom line is this: Should an Iraqi missile or plane get through, and should the Americans urge restraint, Israel will face an acute dilemma - because in addition to its operational leverage, the United States has considerable political and economic leverage.
If it sits out the war, Israel might just be rewarded - though whether that would make up for physical damages to the Israeli home front, and the intangible damage to Israel's deterrent capacity, remains to be seen.
Leslie Susser is the diplomatic correspondent for the Jerusalem Report.
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